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Two Judges Rejected Google Breakups, but DOJ Still Wants Chrome Sold

Judges have twice rejected forced divestitures of Google assets, ordering behavioral changes instead. The DOJ is appealing for Chrome, arguing behavioral remedies won't fix the structural problem.

Screenshot of the Google Chrome browser new tab page with search bar and Google logo
A screenshot of Google Chrome, the web browser at the center of the DOJ antitrust case against Google. WikiPimpi · Public domain · via Wikimedia Commons

The Department of Justice has lost its bid to break Google into pieces—twice. Yet it continues pushing for divestiture on appeal, specifically demanding that Google sell its Chrome browser to the D.C. Circuit after a judge rejected that remedy in the search case. Understanding why requires knowing what the September rulings actually changed for Google's ad and search businesses, and why structural separation looks different from the bench than from the DOJ's enforcement strategy.

Google found itself on the losing end of two antitrust rulings about a year apart, each finding genuine violations but each stopping short of the company breakups prosecutors sought. In September 2025, Judge Amit Mehta ordered behavioral remedies in the search case. In September 2026, Judge Leonie Brinkema rejected forced divestiture of Google's ad-exchange tools. Both judges declined to order divestiture. Both DOJ teams disagreed, but only the search case has reached the cross-appeal stage.

What the September 2025 search ruling changed

Judge Mehta's September 2, 2025 order imposed several restrictions on how Google distributes its search engine and manages data. Google must end exclusive agreements that had made Google Search the default on nearly all phones and computers. The company must also share its search index and user-interaction data with competitors on commercial terms.

The exclusivity ban transforms Google's default position from a protected advantage into a competitive marketplace. Apple, Samsung, and carriers can now entertain offers from Microsoft Bing, newer AI entrants, and other search rivals. Critically, the ruling preserved Google's right to pay for placement, meaning the company can still offer money to secure position—it simply cannot demand exclusivity.

When Mehta rejected the DOJ's proposal to force Google to divest Chrome, he argued that the remedies "overreached in seeking forced divestiture of these key assets, which Google did not use to effect any illegal restraints." His finding was specific: Chrome itself was not the mechanism through which Google maintained illegal monopoly power in search. The browser became the DOJ's structural remedy target precisely because Chrome drives search volume to Google. But Mehta found no evidence that Google weaponized Chrome exclusivity to foreclose rival search engines.

A technical committee will oversee compliance for six years. Remedies began taking effect roughly 60 days after the judgment was finalized and remain in force while the appeals proceed. Google is challenging the data-sharing mandate as creating "artificial competition," while the DOJ and a coalition of state attorneys general filed their cross-appeal by February 3, 2026, seeking structural remedies Mehta declined to impose.

How data-sharing and exclusive contracts reshape distribution

The contract and data-sharing remedies work in tandem to reshape how search competition functions. Banning exclusivity means device makers, browser developers, and carriers face annual contract renewals where they can consider competing offers. Google will likely face higher traffic acquisition costs as it competes for placement against Bing and other alternatives.

Data-sharing creates a potential on-ramp for challengers. Competitors receive access to portions of Google's search index and information about what users search for and which results they click. However, without access to Google's ranking algorithms—the secret formulas that determine search result order—rivals must differentiate through superior product experience or AI integration rather than data parity. The practical effect is that competitors gain the raw materials to start a search engine but retain the formidable challenge of building a product as useful as Google's established service.

Market dynamics experts expect Google to retain high-80s search market share initially, with only modest single-digit erosion as rivals experiment with new models. As of August 2025, according to Brookings Institution analysis, Google maintained approximately 90 percent of the worldwide search market, despite the emergence of generative AI. The real shift involves distribution dynamics becoming more competitive rather than a sudden market collapse. Device makers can now negotiate better terms, and new entrants have a clearer path to consumer traffic, even if Google remains the dominant option.

The ad-tech case also rejected divestiture, then stopped

Google faced antitrust liability in a separate advertising technology case. Judge Leonie Brinkema, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, ruled that Google's publisher-facing tools had unfairly excluded rivals from the ad auction. This case followed a distinct litigation path from the search monopoly case, though both outcomes followed the same pattern: liability found, structural remedies rejected.

The DOJ sought structural remedies: divestiture of Google's ad exchange, AdX, and open-sourcing of DoubleClick for Publishers' auction logic. Prosecutors argued these tools enabled Google to maintain monopolistic control over ad-tech markets. Brinkema declined to impose those remedies. On September 2, 2026, she confirmed that Google must "adjust its business practices to favor competitors," though specifics of implementation remain under seal for 14 days. Unlike the search case, no cross-appeal has yet been filed in the ad-tech case; a final judgment is still due, with the DOJ and Google required to jointly propose one within 30 days of the ruling.

Why both judges rejected structural remedies

Both judges faced the same question: if a company broke antitrust law, when does the violation warrant forcing it to sell a business unit? Mehta concluded that behavioral constraints—ending exclusivity, sharing data—could restore competition in search without severing assets. Brinkema likewise declined to order divestiture in the ad-tech case, though her full reasoning remains under seal.

The DOJ's stated position in the search appeal is that behavioral remedies are insufficient. As the government and states characterized Mehta's order, it amounted to "a slap on the wrist for a recidivist monopolist." Their specific concern is that Google's financial advantage will let it outbid rivals for distribution slots even under non-exclusive annual contracts. No other company, the district court itself acknowledged, will have the resources to match Google's offers to device makers and carriers. A three-judge D.C. Circuit panel will ultimately decide whether an annual bidding war, with all its competitive uncertainty, adequately addresses a structural dominance that took decades to build.

Mehta's response, documented in the September 2025 decision, was that the evidence did not show Google had used Chrome to maintain its search monopoly in the first place. If Chrome played no role in the illegal conduct, divesting it served no purpose in remedying the violation. The appeals court will have to decide whether behavioral restrictions on Google's contracting and data access can realistically change outcomes when one player has vastly more money and can afford to pay its way to default status every single year.

The Chrome appeal and its uncertain path

The DOJ's cross-appeal, filed in February 2026, seeks to restore the Chrome divestiture demand. Oral arguments before a three-judge D.C. Circuit panel are expected later in 2026, with a ruling likely following about a year after the appeal was filed. Google filed its own appeal on May 22, 2026, pressing back on both the monopoly finding and the data-sharing remedy, so the court will weigh arguments from both sides. Both appeals remain live: Google argues the liability verdict was wrong; the DOJ argues the remedy was too weak.

Legal experts assess the probability of forced Chrome divestiture as low. The appeals court would need to overturn Mehta's factual finding that Chrome did not facilitate the illegal monopoly behavior. Appellate courts defer to trial judges' factual conclusions, making that reversal difficult. The DuckDuckGo CEO called the September 2025 ruling a "nothingburger," reflecting skepticism about whether behavioral changes will meaningfully challenge Google's dominance.

Observers also point to a timing problem. Antitrust cases take years to litigate—this case ran from 2020 to 2025, five years of litigation before the remedy even took effect. By the time behavioral constraints on search default agreements become enforceable, the competitive landscape has shifted again. Generative AI emerged and made search more competitive seemingly overnight, according to the court's findings as described in Brookings Institution analysis, yet Google maintained approximately 90 percent traditional search market share as of August 2025. The question facing the appellate court is whether a remedy designed for 2020 competition can address 2026 market realities, or whether both the DOJ and the judges are fighting the last war.